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Insult to Injury: A Constitutional
Challenge to Rhode Island’s Most
Colorful Shaming
Breegan Semonelli*
INTRODUCTION

Every school year, University of Rhode Island students
overwhelm the sand-ridden neighborhoods of Narragansett, and
their considerable presence does not go unnoticed.1 The student
residents typically stake their claim in the otherwise quiet
neighborhoods until the end of May and the dissatisfaction of the
year-round Narragansett residents is no secret.2 Disgruntled
town residents brought their concerns before the town council and,
in response, the town enacted a municipal ordinance to control
and ultimately ban the students’ so-called “unruly gatherings.”3
The ordinance serves as a scarlet letter of sorts,4 requiring that
violators display an orange sticker on the face of their rental
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2017.
1. Sheree R. Curry, Noisy Neighbors Get Noticed in Narragansett, AOL
REAL EST. (Jan. 11, 2011, 5:07 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20150908
115822/http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2011/01/11/noisy-neighbors-get-noticedin-narragansett.
2. See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d
282, 288 (D.R.I. 2010) (“The Town Council blames student renters for
throwing rowdy parties that encourage lawbreaking, such as underage
drinking and fighting.”).
3. Id. See NARRAGANSETT, R.I., CODE ORDINANCES ch. 46, art. 2, § 32
(2007) [hereinafter Ordinance], http://www.narragansettri.gov/Document
Center/Home/View/151.
4. The phrase “scarlet letter” is derived from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s
classic of American literature. See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET
LETTER (Thomas E. Connolly ed., Penguin Classics 2015) (1850).
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612 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:611
property for the remainder of the year.5
Aggrieved student residents challenged the constitutionality
of this ordinance in state court, seeking relief from the colorful
repercussions that the ordinance imposes.6 In URI Student
Senate v. Town of Narragansett, the students asserted that the
ordinance was unconstitutional on several grounds, including that
it violated the notice and opportunity-to-be-heard requirements of
procedural due process.7 After removal to federal court, both the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island and
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held,
seemingly reluctantly,8 that the ordinance was indeed
constitutional under the controlling standard for procedural due
process—the “stigma-plus standard.”9 Developed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, the stigma-plus standard provides
that harm or injury to an individual’s interest in reputation, even
when inflicted by an officer of the state, “does not result in a
deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ recognized by state or
federal law” and, therefore, does not invoke the constitutional
protection of the due process clause.10 In short, under the stigmaplus standard, harm to reputation alone is insufficient to invoke
due process protection.11 To satisfy the “plus” of stigma-plus
standard, the harm to reputation must be paired with proof that
steps taken by “a government actor adversely impact[ed] a right or
status previously enjoyed under state law.”12
5. URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 289. Notably, the District
Court “agree[d] that receiving an orange sticker might be humiliating.” Id. at
297.
6. Id. at 290–91.
7. Id. at 291.
8.
Id. at 302 (“[T]he result sits uneasily with the Court”); URI Student
Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Let us be
perfectly clear. We, like the district court, are uneasy about the absence of a
hearing.”).
9. URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 11–12 (“[T]he appellants have failed
to demonstrate . . . that any of the incremental harms to which they point in
the hope of satisfying the requirements of the stigma plus standard
inevitably results from the Ordinance’s implementation.”); URI Student
Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (“The Court is at a loss for any way to put
Plaintiffs’ injuries into a legal box other than purely reputational harms.”).
10. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976).
11. See id.
12. Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing
Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09).
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Because the student plaintiffs were unable to meet their
burden in satisfying the requisite “plus” requirement, their action
failed in federal court.13 Left without recourse, student residents
and their landlords are forced to display orange stickers on their
targeted rental properties until the end of the year, proclaiming
their misbehavior to the community despite the absence of notice
or a hearing prior to the sticker’s imposition. Though the orange
sticker’s purported intent is to deter the feared “unruly
gatherings,” the practical effect of the punitive ordinance is to
shame the violators.14 To put it simply, the student parties
continue and the only change is that the renters and landlords are
stigmatized.
The Narragansett sticker ordinance illuminates a major gap
in the protection that procedural due process is purported to
afford: “before the government can deprive a person of a protected
interest, it must provide [him or] her with notice and opportunity
to be heard.”15 The stigma-plus standard left the student
plaintiffs unprotected because they were provided with no notice
and no hearing to defend their actions despite the sticker’s
stigmatizing effect. Due to this gap, the stigma-plus standard
should be reconsidered in favor of affording broader protection to
those suffering stigmatization from punishment imposed by the
government, especially when the stigmatization is the result of
official action required by law. While providing notice and a
hearing would certainly bring the ordinance into closer alignment
with the constitutional mandates of due process, even with these
additional protections, the ordinance still is inappropriate. The
orange sticker ordinance is simply an unfitting punishment
because it employs the same shaming tactics as the ever-prevalent
criminal shame punishments, which, though debatable in their
own right, are typically reserved for more severe situations than

13. URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 12; URI Student Senate, 707 F.
Supp. 2d at 298.
14. See ACLU Sues Narragansett Over “Orange Sticker” Policy, ACLU
R.I.
(May
23,
2008),
http://riaclu.org/news/archive-post/aclu-suesnarragansett-over-orange-sticker-policy (“The URI Student Senate has
condemned the ‘orange sticker policy’ as a discriminatory policy aimed at
students to shame them, much like a ‘scarlet letter.’”).
15. RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1 (2004).
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college parties.16
This comment seeks to elucidate the large gap that the
stigma-plus standard creates in procedural due process
protections, to demonstrate that the shaming effect of
Narragansett’s ordinance is inappropriate, and to provide a
practical alternative that municipalities could employ to deter
these so-called unruly gatherings. Part I of this comment will
discuss the significant interest an individual has in preserving his
or her reputation and the historical development in procedural
due process. Part II will elaborate on the growing prevalence of
colonial-style shame punishments in judicial sentencing and the
potential harm of that stigmatization. Finally, Part III will
discuss the aforementioned as applied to the Rhode Island
municipal orange sticker ordinance and provide feasible and
constitutionally sound alternatives to the ordinance that would
alleviate said stigmatization.
I.

THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATION WITH PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS

A. Development of Procedural Due Process
Due process is incorporated in the Fifth and the Fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution, where the
Constitution provides that neither the federal government nor
state governments can deprive a person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.17 Due process has been interpreted as
encompassing two different doctrines—substantive due process
and procedural due process.18 Substantive due process deals
specifically with the adequacy of the government’s reason for

16. See discussion infra Section II.B.
17. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
18. Id. In United States v. Salerno, the Court explained:
[T]he Due Process Clause protects individuals against two types of
government action. So-called “substantive due process” prevents the
government from engaging in conduct that “shocks the conscience,”
or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be
implemented in a fair manner. This requirement has traditionally
been referred to as “procedural” due process.
481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (citations omitted).
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taking a person’s life, liberty, or property.19 Procedural due
process, on the other hand, considers whether the government
conducted such deprivation in a “fair manner.”20
Interpretations of the exact rights afforded by due process,
particularly procedural due process, have been extensive and the
analysis of procedural due process protections afforded to those
who have suffered harm to their reputation is no exception.21
Reputation is defined broadly as “[t]he esteem in which a person is
held by others.”22 It may appear that reputation, on its face, is
not as important of a concern as other interests that traditionally
have been associated with due process violations, like property for
instance. Damage to one’s reputation, however, is a significant
legal interest because, unlike other traditional interests, injury to
one’s reputation cannot be easily remedied with monetary
damages. Instead, a person injured by government stigmatization
has intangible damages, which are virtually impossible to
quantify because damages arising from stigmatization cannot be
quantified in the same way as damages to one’s property. This
difficulty, perhaps, makes reputation an even more significant
legal interest. The Supreme Court conclusions on the topic have
varied and when analyzing whether the government can harm an
individual’s reputation without violating due process, the Court’s
rulings seem to be anything but uniform. Two benchmark cases
exemplify the Court’s variation: Paul v. Davis23 and Wisconsin v.
Constantineau.24
In Constantineau, a statute gave the chief of police the right
to post notices in local businesses prohibiting the sale of goods to
persons “who ‘by excessive drinking’ produce[d] described
conditions or exhibit[ed] specified traits, such as exposing himself
or family ‘to want’ or becoming ‘dangerous to the peace’ of the
19. See id.; Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16
TOURO L. REV. 871, 871 (2000).
20. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
21. See generally Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and
Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79
(2009).
22.
Reputation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d pocket ed. 2006); OXFORD
ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/
us/definition/english/reputation.
23. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
24. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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community.”25 The plaintiff was denied the opportunity to contest
the inclusion of her name on the prohibition list and that the state
failed to provide her with notice that her name would be included
on the list.26 The Supreme Court held that, to some, the posting is
a private interest and “such a stigma or badge of disgrace that
procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard.”27 The Court was explicit that harm to an individual’s
reputation implicated procedural due process concerns, explaining
that “[w]here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity
is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”28
The stigma standard developed in Constantineau triggered a
procedural due process analysis for reputational harms and
Constantineau remained the standard for due process violations
caused by stigma for five years until the Court heightened the
standard in Paul.29 Rejecting the stigma standard bright-line rule
in Constantineau, the Supreme Court narrowed the interpretation
of procedural due process and created the “stigma-plus” standard
of procedural due process in Paul v. Davis.30
Like the plaintiff in Constantineau, the plaintiff in Paul
claimed that the government infringed on his due process rights
by circulating a flyer implicating him of a criminal charge.31 The
state charged the plaintiff with shoplifting and the plaintiff pled
not guilty.32 Despite the fact that the plaintiff was still presumed
innocent, the government nonetheless prepared and circulated a
flyer that identified the plaintiff as an “active shoplifter.”33 As a
result of the flyer, the plaintiff’s supervisor informed the plaintiff
25. Id. at 434–35.
26. Id.; see Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 862-63 (E.D. Wis.
1969).
27. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 436.
28. Id. at 437.
29. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976). Notably, lower court
decisions after Constantineau, but prior to Paul, appeared unwavering on the
question of a reputational interest in due process protection. See, e.g., Suarez
v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1973) (“There is little doubt but that a
person’s interest in his reputation is sufficient to trigger procedural due
process protection.”).
30. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708–09; Mitnick, supra note 21, at 91.
31. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 695–97.
32. Id. at 695.
33. Id.
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that “he ‘had best not find himself in a similar situation’ in the
future.”34 Shortly thereafter, the state dismissed the charges
against the plaintiff and the plaintiff sought redress for a violation
of his constitutional rights.35
The plaintiff argued that the circulation of the flyer
impermissibly denied him constitutionally guaranteed due process
of law. 36 However, the Court rejected plaintiff’s arguments—
although similar to those of the Constantineau plaintiff—and
ultimately narrowed the Court’s previous standard.37 The court
held that harm to reputation alone does not infringe on a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, reasoning that while
the state (in this case, Kentucky) allowed a plaintiff to file
defamation actions to challenge reputational harm, “Kentucky law
[did] not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present
enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as a result of
petitioners’ actions.”38 The Court noted that the weight of their
decisions established no precedent that would convert every claim
of defamation by a state official into a constitutional claim.39 The
Court applied the stigma-plus standard, explaining that while
reputation interests are protected by state tort law, such interests
are not protected by procedural due process.40 Leaving no room
for ambiguity, the Court stated that “any harm or injury to that
[reputational] interest, even where as here inflicted by an officer
of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or
‘property’ recognized by state or federal law.”41 The Court
justified its narrowing of Constantineau in Paul by characterizing
Constantineau as having satisfied the stigma-plus standard;
specifically, the Paul Court rationalized that the police chief’s
34. Id. at 696.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 696–97; Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1180 (6th Cir. 1974);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing, in part, that a state shall not
drive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
37. See Paul, 474 U.S. at 701–02. The Court did not expressly overrule
Constantineau, but rather purported to interpret its “ambiguous[ly]” worded
central holding. Id. at 708–09. This reinterpretation has been criticized as
fallacious by several commentators. Mitnick, supra note 21, at 91–92; see
also infra note 43 and accompanying text.
38. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711–12.
39. Id. at 702.
40. See id. at 711–12.
41. Id. at 712.
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actions in Constantineau not only stigmatized that plaintiff, but
also prevented her from purchasing alcohol, which satisfied as a
“plus” in accordance with the stigma-plus standard.42
B. Backlash of Changing the Reputational Standard
Despite the Supreme Court’s detailed reasoning, critics
responded to the Paul decision with strong contention.43 Much of
that contention focused on the Constantineau Court’s precise
statement that “[t]he only issue present here is whether the label
or characterization given a person by ‘posting,’ though a mark of
serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of
disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard.”44 The Constantineau Court clearly did
not apply the stigma-plus standard because it highlighted that the
only concern was stigmatization, rather than stigmatization “plus”
another interest.45 The Paul majority, however, rationalized that
the Constantineau Court did apply the stigma-plus standard.46
The Paul Court’s blatant “mischaracterization” of the
Constantineau Court’s rather explicit statement that stigma was
the “only issue” before it did not sit well with academia.47 Critics
justifiably dubbed the Court’s interpretation of Constantineau as
“distressingly fast and loose” and “disingenuous.”48
42. Id. at 708–09 (“The ‘stigma’ resulting from the defamatory character
of the posting was doubtless an important factor in evaluating the extent of
harm worked by that act, but we do not think that such defamation, standing
alone, deprived Constantineau of any ‘liberty’ protected by the procedural
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
43. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” And “Property,” 62
CORNELL L. REV. 405, 426 (1977) (“[I]n a ‘Constitution for a free people,’ it is
an unsettling conception of ‘liberty’ that protects an individual against state
interference with his access to liquor but not with his reputation in the
community.”); Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of
Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 571 (1999) (“Scholars have been
relentlessly and uniformly negative in their reactions to the Supreme Court’s
opinion and holding in Paul . . . .”).
44. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (emphasis
added).
45. See id.
46. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708–09.
47. Mitnick, supra note 21, at 91–92; Armacost, supra note 43, at 571;
Rodney A. Smolla, Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort
Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 840 (1982).
48. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 47, at 840.
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The unrest following the Paul decision was extensive and
immediate. The majority opinion in Paul stood before a strong
dissent from Justice Brennan, which prophesied the very real
consequences and implications that the Paul decision invited for
later cases.49 Justice Brennan’s dissent remarked that “[t]he
potential of today’s decision is frightening for a free people.”50 He
recognized the constitutional issues that the majority’s decision
stirred up, observing that the “police here have officially imposed
on respondent the stigmatizing label ‘criminal’ without the
salutary and constitutionally mandated safeguards of a criminal
trial.”51 Continuing, Justice Brennan expressed his concern for
the constitutional repercussions that the Paul decision would have
on future reputation-based disputes, noting specifically:
The logical and disturbing corollary of this holding is that
no due process infirmities would inhere in a statute
constituting a commission to conduct ex parte trials of
individuals, so long as the only official judgment
pronounced was limited to the public condemnation and
branding of a person as a Communist, a traitor, an
“active murderer,” a homosexual, or any other mark that
“merely” carries social opprobrium.52
Justice Brennan’s stated concerns for the implications of the
majority’s decision foretold the backlash that the decision would
face from those who felt that it was both arbitrary and
unnecessary.53
II. RETURN OF SHAME PUNISHMENTS

Changing the due process standard applied to reputational
injuries introduced a number of underlying, yet foreseeable,
concerns.54 By heightening the standard, the Supreme Court
created a barrier to constitutional challenges of shame
punishments, which has contributed to the increased use of

49. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 718.
52. Id. at 721.
53. See, e.g., Mitnick, supra note 21, at 93 (“This sacrifice is particularly
unfortunate, since it was unnecessary.”)
54. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

SEMONELLI_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2016 7:50 PM

620 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:611
government-sponsored shaming tactics. While the examples of
shame punishments discussed in this comment are typically the
result of criminal convictions and Paul v. Davis is inapplicable to
challenge a criminal sentence,55 the shaming strategies used to
impose both criminal and civil shame punishments are similar.
To put it another way, while the challenges to criminal and civil
shame punishments are based on different grounds, the shaming
strategy is effectively the same in both contexts.56 Nevertheless,
even after a hearing, the orange sticker is still an inappropriate
and ineffective punishment, which makes the failure to provide a
hearing even more troubling.
A. History of Shame Punishments
Shame has been described as “the loss of face in the eyes of
neighbors who have the village habit of condemning any kind of
deviance and from whom one cannot escape.”57 The intent of
shame punishments in both criminal and civil cases is just that –
to stigmatize the offender.58 Most modern shaming punishments
allow the state to express its disapproval of the offender by
publicly stigmatizing him or her without the physical pain that
often accompanied earlier shaming laws.59
American shame punishments are rooted in colonial America,
where corporal punishments “were meant to inflict both public
55. Paul did not involve a criminal sentence, but rather a posting that
was released without any determination of plaintiff Davis’s guilt or
innocence. Paul, 424 U.S. at 695–96.
56. While challenges to the criminal sentences discussed herein would
focus on whether the shaming serves a valid governmental interest, the civil
orange sticker at issue here raises the question of whether the recipient has a
right to a hearing to challenge the sticker.
57. James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?. 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1998). Whitman continued to recognize
that there is no point of shaming individuals “who are likely . . . to move in an
underworld population that is very far from condemning the deviant.” Id.
He further posited that “at its worst, shaming such characters may simply
force them to renounce law-abiding society entirely, moving into the
underworld for good.” Id.
58. See Chad Flanders, Shaming and the Meaning of Punishment, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609, 610 & n.4 (2006).
59. See id. at 612; Kenneth C. Haas, Public Shaming as Punishment, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 356, 357 (Shannon M. BartonBellessa ed., 2012) (describing the use of “painful corporal punishments” in
colonial America)
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humiliation and intense pain.”60
“The whipping post, the
61
branding iron, and the pillory were prominently displayed and
frequently employed in the town-squares of 17th and 18th century
America.”62 Branding was particularly popular in all of the
American colonies.63 The shame punishments of colonial America
continued as the primary means of punishing criminals until the
ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 and the introduction of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.64
The Bill of Rights bespoke an era of enlightenment in which
the appropriateness and effectiveness of 16th- and 17th-century
methods of shame-and-pain punishment.65 Additionally, the age
of enlightenment coincided with changing demographic patterns
that contributed to the decline of shaming punishments for other
reasons.66 The population increased and residents of the small
colonial towns began migrating to the cities, which “increased
anonymity, a greater appreciation of the value of privacy, and a
decreasing dependence on close community relationships.”67 The
result of the changing demographic was a prominent decrease in
shaming
punishments
because
of
their
perceived
inappropriateness in the changing American society.
60. Haas, supra note 59, at 357. These types of punishments were
routinely given to “vagrants, beggars, petty thieves, Sabbath breakers, and
other minor offenders.” Id.
61. Haas further explains colonial use of the pillory:
Political and religious leaders found the pillory (a set of wooden
frames with holes for the head, hands, and sometimes the feet) to be
an especially versatile device for inflicting a large dose of shame and
a requisite measure of pain. The spectacle of a miscreant helpless in
its grasp, his head protruding through its beams and his hands
through two holes, was thought to educate the public as to the
consequences of sinful behavior and to send a deterrent message to
both the humiliated lawbreaker and others who might be tempted to
stray from the strict tenets of colonial moral standards. Culprits
could expect to be pelted with ridicule and insults as well as with
sticks and stones. The more serious misdemeanants were sometimes
nailed through their ears to the pillory, branded, and shaved bald.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 357–58.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 358.
67. Id.
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B. Shame Punishment in Modern Society
However, as of late, shame punishments have become more
prevalent, with increasing political support.68 Some interpret the
recurrence of shame punishments as a response to an increased
desire for expressionism in law.69 Others attribute the return of
shame punishments in modern America not to a desire for
expressionism, but rather to the judiciary’s desire for media
attention.70 However, perhaps a more plausible argument for the
return of shame punishments, especially in the criminal context,
is the arguable ineffectiveness of existing punishment methods in
the American judicial system.71
Public complaints about our judicial system are unrelenting
and extensive.72 The increase in the prevalence of shame
punishments is perhaps attributable, therefore, to this common
disdain for the criminal justice system.73 Shame punishments
may be viewed as a result of general dissatisfaction with the
criminal justice system, as such punishments are arguably a valid
alternative to imprisonment,74 especially for minor infractions.
68. Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing
Names and Pictures of Prostitutes’ Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1534
(1996); Scott E. Sanders, Note, Scarlet Letters, Bilboes and Cable TV: Are
Shame Punishments Cruel and Outdated or Are They a Viable Option for
American Jurisprudence?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 359, 367 (1998).
69. See Flanders, supra note 58, at 611–12 (“The law does not exist
merely to allocate benefits and burdens; it also says things though its
actions.”). See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503
(2000).
70. See Lynn Debruin, ‘Shame’ Punishments Like Ponytail Cutting
Increase, DESERET NEWS (June 25, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews
.com/article/765585887/Shame-punishments-like-ponytail-cutting-increase
.html (“Such unconventional sentences that shame defendants are steadily
increasing and turning state courts into circus shows.”).
71. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1884 (1991).
72. Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal
Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1099 (2014) (“The American criminal justice
system is on trial. A chorus of commenters—often but not exclusively in the
legal academy—has leveled a sharp indictment of criminal process in our
country.”).
73. See Massaro, supra note 71, at 1884.
74. See id. at 1885 (“[D]issatisfaction with the primary punishment
options [including prison] has led to experimental, creative sanctions and

SEMONELLI_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/20/2016 7:50 PM

INSULT TO INJURY: ORANGE STICKERS

623

Those who defend shame punishments consider them efficient in
punishing offenders because shame punishments reflect the
state’s disapproval of the defendant without the heavy fiscal
burden that comes with imprisonment.75
Shaming in criminal sentences comes in the form of ordering
a defendant to wear a humiliating sign in public. For example, in
March 2013, Cleveland, Ohio Municipal Court Judge Pinkey Carr
ordered a defendant “to stand outside a police station for three
hours a day for one week with a sign . . . stating ‘I was being an
idiot and it will never happen again’” after he threatened police
officers.76 In April 2014, Cleveland municipal Judge Gayle
Williams-Byer ordered a defendant to stand on a street corner for
five hours with a sign that stated, “I AM A BULLY! I pick on
children that are disabled, and I am intolerant of those that are
different from myself. My actions do not reflect an appreciation for
the diverse South Euclid community that I live in.”77
Additionally, a Georgia judge sentenced a defendant in 2012 to
wear a sign that said, “I made a fool out of myself on a Bibb
County Public Schools bus” for one week.78 In December 2013,
Montana District Judge G. Todd Baugh sentenced a defendant to
write “Boys do not hit girls” 5,000 times as part of his punishment
for assaulting his girlfriend.79 In Pennsylvania, a defendant was
sentenced to stand in front of the courthouse holding a sign that
read, “I stole from a 9-year-old on her birthday! Don’t steal or this
could happen to you.”80 In 2010, Harris County, Texas Judge
Kevin Fine ordered two defendants to stand at a busy intersection
every weekend for six years holding signs that said “I am a
thief.”81
Though the aforementioned examples of criminal shame
probation conditions, which include the ‘shaming and shunning’ practices.”).
75. See, e.g., Aaron S. Book, Shame on You: An Analysis of Modern
Shame Punishment as an Alternative to Incarceration, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 653, 657 (1999).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
The defendants, apparently a married couple, were also
“required to post a sign in front of their house that included their names and
said they were convicted thieves.” Id.
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punishments appear somewhat childish, they reflect a growing
trend of using shame as an alternative to incarceration.
Furthermore, the colorfulness and the public nature of such
punishments support the notion that the judges believed that
shaming the individuals might deter them, and others, from
similar missteps in the future.
In addition to the apparently constitutional shame
punishments that have been imposed by judges in recent years,
there have been multiple instances in which such criminal
shaming tactics have been called illegal or unconstitutional by
critics, if not higher courts.82 For example, an Oklahoma judge
ordered a defendant to attend church for ten years as punishment
for a DUI manslaughter charge.83 The Oklahoma ACLU had
condemned the sentence as a “clear violation” of the defendant’s
First Amendment rights.84 Moreover, in Cameron County, Texas,
Justice of the Peace Gustavo Garza allowed parents to avoid
paying a fine if they would instead spank their children in his
courtroom.85
The State Commission on Judicial Conduct
determined that Judge Garza exceeded his judicial discretion by
providing parents with a “safe haven” to impose corporal
punishment.86
Similarly, in August 2014, a Pennsylvania
Superior Court struck down a shaming sentence imposed on
disgraced former state Supreme Court Justice Joan Orie Melvin
requiring her to send pictures of herself wearing handcuffs to
judges across the state.87 The Superior Court reasoned that the
sentence was not “legitimately intended for her rehabilitation,”
but rather “solely intended to shame her” and, therefore, was not
authorized by the state’s sentencing code.88
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; Bryan Newell, ACLU of Oklahoma Files Judicial Complaint
Against Judge for Unconstitutionally Requiring Defendant to Attend Church,
ACLU OKLA. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://acluok.org/2012/12/aclu-of-oklahoma-filesjudicial-complaint-against-judge-for-unconstitutionally-requiring-defendantto-attend-church.
85. David M. Reutter, For Shame! Public Shaming Sentences on the
Rise, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
news/2015/feb/4/shame-public-shaming-sentences-rise/.
86. Id.
87. Id. Id.; Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 56 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2014). Id.
88. Melvin, 103 A.3d at 55-56.
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The aforementioned criminal examples reflect that judges
have been skirting the line between shaming punishments that
further the notions of justice and those that exceed its boundaries.
The difference between permissible and impermissible judicially
sanctioned shaming appears to lie in the extremity of the shame
associated with the punishment.
C. Lasting Effect of Shame Punishments
While the judiciary has weaved certain elements of shame
into their sentencing, the resulting harm to one’s reputation is not
to be taken lightly.89 Presumably, the reason for the arguable
effectiveness of punitive shaming is the heightened importance
that individuals place on reputation.90
Public shaming is
designed to “strip[] . . . the anonymity afforded by modern
society.”91 “[S]haming penalties threaten not only to degrade the
offender, but, by enlisting the public as a party to the punishment,
threaten to bring out the worst in humanity by encouraging the
public to vent its feelings of hatred and vindictiveness directly
onto the offender.”92
It is true that criminal shaming
punishments damage one’s reputation in lieu of constraining one’s
physical liberty through imprisonment.
“Shaming penalties
manifest an objective disrespect for the offender by shaming him,
and they incite subjective attitudes of disrespect by making
individual citizens instruments of the offender’s punishment.”93
In reality, the lasting result of stigmatizing an individual is

89. Whitman, supra note 57, at 1057 (“Some commentators . . . argue
that shame sanctions are inordinately cruel to the offender.”) (citing Massaro,
supra note 71, at 1942–43).
90. See Persons, supra note 68, at 1541–42 (explaining that
“[p]rospective johns . . . tend to have the status and stake in the community
that make shame punishments a particularly effective deterrent: loss of selfesteem and loss of face are apt to be especially unpleasant when a moral
reputation holds high value.”); see also Book, supra note 75, at 686 (providing
that “[t]he psychology of shame shows that it is a powerful tool in shaping
behavior throughout an individual’s lifetime.”).
91. Recent Legislation, Washington State Community Protection Act
Serves as Model for Other Initiatives by Lawmakers and Communities—1990
Wash. Laws ch. 3, §§ 101-1406 (Codified as Amended in Scattered Sections of
Wash. Rev. Code), 108 HARV. L. REV. 787, 790 (1995).
92. Flanders, supra note 58, at 617.
93. See id. at 617–18.
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much greater than the Paul decision suggested.94 Historically,
where colonists used public beatings to punish criminals, the
physical punishment was married with psychological shaming
that was considered to be the most painful element of the
penalty.95 In fact, “authorities often felt free to dispense with the
punishment’s physical component entirely: some offenders were
required simply to stand in public with signs cataloging their
crimes, a punishment that relied solely on mental anguish for its
deterrent effect.”96 The colonial shaming methods are eerily
similar to the shaming methods that courts have imposed
recently; as aforementioned, judges have recently been imposing a
number of criminal shaming punishments that employ the use of
signage in public to effectively humiliate the defendant.97
Shaming punishments, both civil and criminal, are public in a way
that imprisonment is not because the penalty is effective only as
far as it is viewed by the public.98
III. APPLICATION TO RHODE ISLAND ORDINANCES: “ORANGE STICKER”

The barrier that the Paul Court created to constitutional
challenges of reputational-based punishment was exemplified in
URI Student Senate.99 The University of Rhode Island students,
student government, and owners of rental property in the largely
student-occupied town of Narragansett100 brought a constitutional
94. See generally Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
95. See Sanders, supra note 68, at 363 (citing Dan M. Kahan, What do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 611 (1996)).
96. ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND
PUNISHMENTS IN EARLY AMERICA 34 (1992).
97. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.
98. See Flanders, supra note 58, at 622:
Shaming does degrade the status of the offender, and it uses public
humiliation as the mechanism of this degradation. But it does not
follow from the fact that shaming works only in public and
imprisonment does not that the latter type of punishment sends no
message to the offender about his relative worth. Indeed, prison’s
expressive message may be just as powerful as shaming’s expressive
message.
Id.
99. See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d
282, 303 (D.R.I. 2010) (“The Court is at a loss for any way to put Plaintiffs’
injuries into a legal box other than purely reputational harms.”).
100. “Approximately twenty-two percent of the housing stock in the Town
consists of seasonal or vacation rental units, attracting many students during
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challenge in state court regarding the municipal ordinance that
permitted orange stickers to be applied to the outside of the rental
properties that students either occupied or rented.101
The
students’ attempts, however, were fruitless; after the case was
removed to federal court based on federal question, the attempts
at justice were hindered by the stigma-plus standard announced
in Paul.102
A. The Development of the Orange Sticker Ordinance
The municipal ordinance was enacted in 2005, and later
amended in 2007, as a response to the yearly Narragansett
residents’ disdain for the seasonal residents’ rowdy behavior.103
The Narragansett residents had repeatedly complained of
“quality-of-life issues resulting from high turnover and absentee
landlords.”104 The residents’ concerns included “overcrowding,
property abuse, excessive traffic, noise, litter, public drunkenness,
underage drinking, and fights.”105
The town intended the
municipal ordinance to address the concerns of the yearly
residents by banning what they called “unruly gatherings” and
permitting the police to break up parties that they perceive are
causing a “substantial disturbance of the quiet enjoyment of
private or public property in a significant segment of a
neighborhood.”106 The ordinance allows the police to act if the
disturbance is the result of a “violation of law,” and it provides a
“nonexhaustive list of misdemeanors that authorize the police to
intervene.”107 The listed misdemeanors appropriately address the
concerns of the yearly residents such as excessive noise or traffic,

the school year.” Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. at 290–91.
102. See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 2011) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)) (“The Supreme
Court has made clear that a procedural due process claim cannot rest upon
reputational harm alone.”); URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 297 (“The
Court agrees that receiving an orange sticker might be humiliating.
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that due process claims cannot
rest on harm to ‘reputation alone.’” (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 701)).
103. See URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 288–89 (quoting Ordinance § 31(a)).
107. Id. at 289 (citing Ordinance § 31(a)).).
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public drunkenness, and litter, to name a few.108
The requisite misdemeanor enables the police to act and
subsequently disperse the gathering that they perceive to be a
nuisance.109 The police must then post a notice, which consists of
a ten-by-fourteen inch orange sticker placed in the vicinity of the
front entrance, prominently on the premises.110 The stickers are
not only prominently displayed and brightly-colored, but the
presence of a sticker means that any similar violation in the
future will require a fine.111 The District Court explained that
“[t]he sticker warns that any further police intervention for a
nuisance violation at the same address during a designated time
period will result in ‘joint and several liability’ for sponsors of a
gathering, the residents and owners of the premises, and any
guests who cause the nuisance.”112
In addition to posting the orange sticker, the municipality
compiles and maintains information relating to violations of the
municipal ordinance.113 Narragansett maintains “nuisance house
lists” that display the addresses where the “unruly gatherings”
that have required police intervention in both present and past
seasons.114 Narragansett also maintains a “URI Stats” chart to
exclusively track data regarding infractions committed specifically
by University of Rhode Island students that required police
intervention and warranted an orange sticker to be posted.115

108. Id. (citing Ordinance § 31(a)).
109. See id.
110. Id. (citing Ordinance § 32(a)–(b)).
111. See id. at 289–90. “The first post-sticker police intervention at an
unruly gathering during the posting period triggers a fine of $300; the second,
$400; and the third, $500.” Id. at 290 (citing Ordinance § 35(a)).
112. Id. at 289.
113. Id. at 290.
114. Id. at 290. The court provided that:
The Town compiles information related to enforcing the Ordinance.
“Nuisance house lists” display all addresses where police have
dispersed an “unruly gathering,” and show which houses have
stickers during a given season. The Town also maintains a “URI
Stats” chart to track data on infractions specifically committed by
URI students.
Id.
115. Id.
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B. Fatal Flaws of the Orange Sticker Litigation
The constitutional infringement claim in URI Student Senate
fizzled in the District Court and on appeal due to a failure to
satisfy the procedural due process stigma-plus standard; thus,
“the interests cited [fell] shy of constitutional protection.”116
Specifically on the issue of procedural due process, the Plaintiff’s
argument was that “the absence of an opportunity for a hearing on
whether there are legitimate grounds to place a sticker on a
house—and thereby to malign the reputation of its owner and
residents—offends due process.”117 The District Court agreed that
receiving an orange sticker “might be humiliating,” but under the
stigma-plus standard the plaintiffs were required to identify a
tangible interest that the government impaired in placing stickers
on their houses.118 The Court explained, moreover, that “a valid
‘plus’ factor requires the loss of ‘government benefices denied as a
result of governmental action.’”119 Both courts held that the
plaintiffs failed to identify a sufficient “plus” interest because all
of the alleged interests “involve[d] third parties in some way.”120
The students’ and landlords’ failure to identify a tangible
interest that was deprived as a direct result of the orange sticker
was fatal to their claim.121 The result, however, did not sit lightly
with Chief Judge William E. Smith, who explicitly noted:
[T]he result sits uneasily with the Court. Experience
teaches that law enforcement is not perfect. What
happens if the police, though acting in good faith, put
116. Id. at 296.
117. Id. at 297.
118. Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
119. Id. at 298 (quoting Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 63
(1st Cir. 1998)).).
120. Id.; URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 9–10
(1st Cir. 2011). The District Court described some of the alleged harms that
it found insufficient due to third party involvement:
[A]s a result of the Town informing URI when student houses get
stickers, some Plaintiffs have endured academic discipline, and one
was suspended from the hockey team. Several have also been
evicted from their apartments. As for the landlord Plaintiffs, some
have been unable to rent apartments for some reason.
URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
121. URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 298; URI Student Senate,
631 F.3d at 12.
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stickers on some homes where no “unruly gathering”
actually occurred? Such errors appear to fall between the
cracks and allow for no remedy.
They are not
constitutional violations, nor, in the majority of cases, the
types of mistakes that would be fruitful to pursue in a
defamation lawsuit.122
The District Court concluded by asking “whether wrongfullyapplied stickers simply evade a meaningful remedy altogether.”123
The First Circuit expressed similar reservations in its decision
upholding the orange sticker ordinance as constitutional.124
Without any ambiguity, Judge Bruce M. Selya wrote “[l]et us be
perfectly clear. We, like the district court, are uneasy about the
absence of a hearing.”125
In light of the reservations of both the district and appellate
courts, it seems evident that the stigma-plus standard of
procedural due process is inadequate to remedy the stigmatizing
effect of the ordinance.
C. Shame Implications of the Orange Sticker Ordinance
Shaming appears to be the primary purpose of the orange
sticker. Just as colonial towns required wrongdoers to hold signs
in order to effectuate public shaming, URI students must live with
a sign on their home making them targets of public and
governmental scrutiny. Worse yet, the shame sanction is—
literally—tacked on to the residence, rather than attaching to a
particular “unruly” resident or residents convicted of the requisite
misdemeanor.126 The attachment to the dwelling creates a ripple
effect of shame: the dwelling, the renters, any guests of the house,
and the landlord all are branded by the orange sticker.
Presumably, the ordinance seeks to protect against the downwind
effect of the branding by permitting residents, owners, and
sponsors to assert the defense that only “uninvited participants”
engaged in the illegal conduct.127 However, the ordinance’s
122. Id. at 302.
123. Id.
124. See URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 11–12.
125. Id.
126. See Ordinance § 32(a).
127. URI Student Senate, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (citing Ordinance §
34(a)(5)).
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remedy is procedurally unsound since the participants are deemed
liable prior to a hearing.
D. Feasible Alternatives to the Orange Sticker Ordinance
The stigma-plus standard of procedural due process invites
shame punishments, as exemplified by the orange sticker
ordinance challenged in URI Student Senate. Though the Paul
decision was issued in 1976, that standard is now archaic and
facilitates antiquated punishments that were barely suited for
colonial times—if properly suited for any era at all. It is necessary
for the Supreme Court to overturn the Paul decision to prevent
outdated shame punishments from continuing without an
adequate process for claimants to resist such punishments.
In Paul, Justice Brennan’s dissent alluded to plausible
alternatives to the confining stigma-plus standard and
emphasized the need for a broader definition of liberty.128
Specifically, Justice Brennan noted that liberty should include
“the enjoyment of one’s good name and reputation” as has “been
recognized repeatedly in [Supreme Court] cases as being among
the most cherished of rights enjoyed by a free people.”129 The
willingness of the Paul majority to “dismiss the idea that
standalone stigmatic harm could constitute deprivation of liberty
without ever attempting to define, or even consider more deeply,
the nature of liberty”130 creates a doctrine that is too narrow to
remedy stigmatization injuries. A broader interpretation of
liberty so as to address stigmatization would be more appropriate,
to which the majority in Constantineau alluded where it utilized a
broad interpretation of liberty that incorporated reputational
injuries.131 The Constantineau Court said it best:
Yet certainly where the State attaches “a badge of
infamy” to the citizen, due process comes into play. “The
right to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve
the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a
128. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 714–35 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
129. Id. at 722–23.
130. Mitnick, supra note 21, at 118.
131. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
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principle basic to our society.”132
The orange sticker doubles as a scarlet letter, branding both
the residents and the invitees as the sort that are unruly or at
least associate with the unruly. If the Supreme Court is reluctant
to modify the standard for reputational harm, then an adequate
short-term solution may be achieved at the municipal level
through modification of the ordinance. As both the district and
the appellate court noted in their thorough opinions, the absence
of a hearing is the most significant cause of concern surrounding
the ordinance,133 so requiring at least that much is a first vital
step in enhancing the fairness of the ordinance’s application.
E. Ineffectiveness of the Orange Sticker Ordinance
Moreover, the effectiveness of the orange sticker ordinance is
largely unknown. It is an open question as to whether the
ordinance has resulted in a decrease in the number of house
parties and eased the concerns of the yearly residents.134 Notably,
in 2014, nine years after the town implemented the ordinance, the
town council voted to raise the penalties for other nuisanceoriented ordinances after one particularly rowdy weekend.135 The
Narragansett Town Council increased the penalties after a towndescribed “riot”: Narragansett town manager, Pamela Nolan,
explained “[i]n 25 years of being a town manager, I’ve never seen
anything as disruptive, volatile and violent as that riot on
Saturday.”136 The “riot” induced town residents to again express
their continued disdain for the student-renters, describing the

132. Id. at 437 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
133. See URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1, 11–12
(1st Cir. 2011); URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d
282, 302 (D.R.I. 2010).
134. See Daniel Luzer, The Party Sticker, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan. 7, 2011,
10:00 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/college_guide/blog/the_party_
sticker.php (“[I]t remains unclear whether or not the orange sticker policy,
which has been in place since 2005, has reduced the number of loud parties
occurring in Narragansett.”).
135. Donita Naylor, Narragansett Takes First Steps to Increase Penalties
for Drunken Behavior After Weekend Disturbance, PROVIDENCE J. (May 18,
2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20140508/NEWS/
305089977.
136. Id.
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neighborhood as “hell.”137
What can be inferred from the
neighborhood’s remarks at the town meeting is that the orange
sticker ordinance has not solved the “unruly gathering” problem
and begs the question of whether, then, other Rhode Island
municipalities, such as Providence and Newport, should
reconsider implementing comparable ordinances.138 Conceivably,
municipalities consider the ordinance to be a viable option because
they are at a loss of what exactly will calm the “hell” in their
neighborhoods. The towns’ dilemmas, however, more likely stem
from the disconnect between the towns and students who only
pass through for four, sometimes five, years. The orange stickers
do not deter the student renters because the students are in a
unique position of being able to sidestep the stigmatization. More
often than not, students pack up and leave as soon as they
complete their required course-load, leaving their Narragansett
stigmatization, along with their security deposits, in their dust.
As the constant link between the student renters and the
towns, it is possible that landlords may be the key to solving the
disruption between them. Landlords are the sole entity that can
bridge the gap between the two and perhaps give the yearlyresidents the peace they seek. The landlords, however, are
themselves particularly disconnected from the town. One report
noted that “[a]bout 50 percent of the rental properties are owned
by absentee landlords who live out of state in New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Connecticut. Another chunk may
live elsewhere in Rhode Island.”139 The District Court elucidated
the absentee landlord problem as well, explaining that “[t]he
Town has long complained of quality-of-life issues resulting from
high turnover and absentee landlords.”140
137. Id. (“One neighbor struggled to compose himself as he said he can’t
have his grandchildren over because of drunken behavior in the
neighborhood. ‘It’s like being in hell in this town,’ Joe Santos said. ‘It’s
unbelievable.’”).
138. See Olga Enger, Nuisance Houses Targeted, NEWPORT THIS WK. (Jan.
7, 2016), http://www.newportthisweek.com/news/2016-01-07/Front_Page/
Nuisance_Houses_Targeted.html; Gregory Smith, Providence Police Start
Putting Orange Stickers on ‘Party Houses’, PROVIDENCE J. (Oct. 21, 2013,
10:01 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20131021/NEWS/31021
9989.
139. Curry, supra note 1.
140. URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 707 F. Supp. 2d 282,
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Considering that the town’s absentee landlords are seemingly
at the heart of the issue, the town is ineffectively targeting the
properties and student-renters with relatively minor fiscal
penalties in comparison to the $350,000 to $500,000 landlord
investment.141 As noted, the students are elusive compared to the
yearly residents and the landlords are not significantly affected by
the relatively minor penalty. In fact, one Narragansett property
owner commented that “once a home is branded with a sticker, it
does deter students from wanting to rent the place,” but that
“most landlords will not evict their tenants due to the
shortfall.”142
The town would be more successful in deterring renters’ bad
behavior if they enacted an ordinance aimed directly at the out-ofstate landlords rather than the landlords’ properties and,
accordingly, increased the fines to create an incentive for the
landlords to better regulate their properties.
The current
ordinance does not incentivize landlords because, as mentioned,
the landlords have a considerable, profitable investment in the
seasonal housing and the current ordinance does nothing to harm
that investment.143 As such, rather than punishing the students
and branding them in a town that they likely will flee in less than
half a decade, the town might do better to punish the landlords
because they have a greater connection to the town.
CONCLUSION

Despite the questionable effectiveness and constitutionality of
the ordinance, other Rhode Island municipalities with similar
demographics have welcomed analogous ordinances to deal with
similar seasonal renter complaints from residents, including
Providence and Newport. In Providence, a police official explained
that the purpose of the orange stickers is “[t]o put people on notice
that they are running afoul of the law and to call them out into
the public eye for their misbehavior.”144
The orange sticker ordinance’s appeal is not surprising; it
soothes the grumbles of the residents by—literally—displaying
288 (D.R.I. 2010).
141. See Curry, supra note 1.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Smith, supra note 146.
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their disdain for the “unruly,” while also giving police advanced
notice of a dwelling likely to be hosting “unruly gatherings.” The
ordinance, however, is primarily successful—not in accomplishing
its underlying rationale—but rather in marginalizing seasonal
renters through shaming. It is undisputed that the municipal
ordinance is favorable to the yearly residents of Narragansett.
While yearly residents certainly have more leverage when it
comes to demanding peace and quiet within Narragansett,
shaming student renters is an archaic way to remedy the problem.
This antiquated system ought to be cured through either a
reconsideration of the stigma-plus standard, a modification of the
Narragansett ordinance to target the proper audience, or both.
Left unaltered, this ordinance will not only continue to add insult
to injury for those currently being damaged by its stigmatic
effects, but it may also lead other Rhode Island towns, in addition
to those it has already, to adopt similarly problematic ordinances.

